

DESIGN AND STRUCTURE IN LIVY: 5.32-55

T. J. LUCE

Princeton University

Livy's history has been criticized for its lack of design and structure.¹ The historian, it is affirmed, was not sufficiently in control of his material: the narrative wanders, and on occasion sags; there is a want of focus, of clarity, of balance, of continuity. Professor Syme has been particularly critical: "He is betrayed by ignorance of politics and warfare, by lack of critical principles—and, above all, by incapacity to dominate the material with design and structure."²

Numerous reasons may be advanced in explanation or extenuation. First, the great bulk of the history, as well as the huge time-span covered, militate against an easy conception of the whole. Aristotle's illustration of a creature of great size comes to mind (*Poet.* 1451A): "Since the eye cannot take it in all at once, the unity and sense of the

¹ The following works are cited by the author's last name: E. **Burck**, *Die Erzählungskunst des T. Livius* (Berlin 1934), reprinted Berlin/Zurich 1964; F. **Hellmann**, *Livius-Interpretationen* (Berlin 1939); O. **Hirschfeld**, "Zur Camillus-Legende," *Festschrift für L. Friedländer* (Leipzig 1895) 125-38; A. **Momigliano** "Camillus and Concord," *CQ* 36 (1942) 111-20 = *Secondo Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici* (Rome 1960) 89-104; T. **Mommsen**, "Die gallische Katastrophe," *Römische Forschungen* 2 (Berlin 1879) 297-381; F. **Münzer**, *RE* 7 (1910) 324-48 s.v. "Furius" (44); R. M. **Ogilvie**, *A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5* (Oxford 1965); F. **Schachermeyr**, "Die gallische Katastrophe," *Klio* 23 (1929) 277-305; E. **Täubler**, "Camillus und Sulla," *Klio* 12 (1912) 219-33; F. W. **Walbank**, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius I* (Oxford 1957); P. G. **Walsh**, *Livy, his Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge 1961); K. **Witte**, "Über die Form der Darstellung in Livius' Geschichtswerk," *RhM* 65 (1910) 270-305, 359-419, reprinted separately, Darmstadt 1969; J. **Wolski**, "La prise de Rome par les Celtes et la formation de l'annalistique Romaine," *Historia* 5 (1956) 24-52; M. **Zimmerer**, *Der Annalist Qu. Claudius Quadrigarius* Diss. (Munich 1937). The writer thanks the Association's anonymous referee and Professor W. V. Harris for their helpful criticisms and suggestions.

² *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958) 1.139; compare also 148: "Admirable as Livy is in the eloquence of a speech, in descriptive colouring, and in narrative movement, he shows no comparable skill when events have to be grouped and interrelated—and no instinct for historical structure. For disposition as for material he is content on the whole to follow his sources."

whole is lost for the spectator.”³ A second reason stems from the prevailing view of how Livy used his sources. Almost totally dependent on them, yet unable adequately to criticize or master the difficulties of their use, the historian was generally content to reproduce their materials and the ordering of those materials, together with their biases and occasionally even their language. Specifically, he selected only two or three authorities as the chief sources for extended sections, alternating between them; he seldom conflated, but usually used one at a time, appending variant versions, usually statistical in nature, at odd intervals. The resulting picture is of a compiler moving back and forth between authorities somewhat randomly, uncertain as to exactly what was coming up next, himself taking full charge of the material only when opportunities for eloquence, high drama, or moralizing presented themselves.⁴

Efforts have been made to alter or soften this view, but they have been sporadic and fragmentary. Kurt Witte in a pioneering effort showed how Livy adapted Polybius in order to achieve balance, movement, and structure. His findings are instructive, but he maintained that Livy seldom looked beyond the single episode (the *Einzel-erzählung*) in making his adaption. Witte may, however, have been led to this conclusion as much from the fragmentary nature of the Polybian text as from his analysis of Livy’s narrative. A number of other studies on individual episodes have confirmed and extended Witte’s findings.⁵ In addition, analyses of special aspects of the

³ Livy himself is in part responsible for this impression. At 31.1.5, with 112 books still to come, he compared himself to a man drowning in the vastness of his undertaking. But he should not be taken too seriously; the deprecation and self-effacing are largely a pose: see Hellmann’s sensible remarks, 19, note, 2. On Livy and Aristotelian canons see Burck 181.

⁴ Walsh 110–72 gives a summary of the subject. R. M. Ogilvie’s study on how Livy used Licinius Macer in Book Four is an illustration of the prevailing view: *JRS* 48 (1958) 40–46. Only a few have demurred; most vehement is M. L. W. Laistner, *The Greater Roman Historians* (Berkeley 1947) 83–102. M. Zimmerer is one of the few who have attempted to explain *why* Livy used his sources as he appears to have done (see esp. 36–43, 65–68); she believes that for Books 31–45 his manner of alternating between Claudius Quadrigarius, Valerius Antias, and Polybius was due to the effective contrast which they offered among themselves in content, outlook, and style. Since she believes Livy intentionally mirrored *all* these features in his narrative, his own contribution, in her view, would appear to have been slight.

⁵ See, for example, Walsh 191–97; also *RhM* 97 (1954) 97–114 on sieges and naval battles. Not all estimates have been wholly favorable; for example, R. Jumeau finds much unevenness in a stylistic analysis of 30.18–26: *RPh* 65 (1939) 21–43.

narrative have demonstrated a high degree of structure; the speeches comprise one such area, while style has been shown to have influenced considerably the design of the whole and of special types of episodes.⁶ At the other end of the spectrum are analyses of the large-scale structure of the 142 books of the *Ab Urbe Condita*. From the extant books and the Periochae it is clear that Livy designed and composed the early part of his history by the pentad and groups of pentads. But as the narrative of the later years became increasingly detailed, such exact grouping became difficult, and ultimately impossible, to achieve.⁷

The most significant study on design and structure in Livy is that of Erich Burck, *Die Erzählungskunst des T. Livius*. Using the parallel narrative of Dionysius for comparison, Burck was able to show clearly that in the first pentad Livy gave great attention to the development of overall structure and thematic unity. The full implications of this study for Livy's method of composing and his use of sources have not yet been properly appreciated, although thirty-seven years have passed since the book first appeared. Nor, surprisingly, have others gone on to analyze the later pentads and decades along similar lines. As a result, much remains to be done before an adequate conception of the design and structure of the *Ab Urbe Condita*, or the lack of it, can be gained.

This essay is an effort to fill in a small part of this considerable gap. The last half of Book Five, comprising the defeat at the Allia and the sack of Rome by the Gauls, has been chosen for analysis. Although Burck treated it in his book, he did so in a somewhat summary fashion, reserving as he did the fifth book to near the end of his study, and using it chiefly to confirm his earlier findings. Yet the design of this section is more complex than Burck apparently realized, and illustrates in brief compass how intricate structure can be in Livy, what a wide variety of narrative techniques were employed to that end, and how free and thorough his adaptation of source material could be at times.⁸ In fact,

⁶ On the speeches see Walsh 219-44. A. H. McDonald's discussion of style in Livy is excellent, *JRS* 47 (1957) 155-72. On particular episodes see McDonald for the Hercules and Cacus story (1.7.4-7), and Walsh 250-51 on Manlius and the Geese (5.47.1-6).

⁷ See Walsh 6-9; H. Bornecque, *Tite-Live* (Paris 1933) 11-23; R. Syme, *HSCP* 64 (1959) 27-87, esp. 28-42.

⁸ The following discussion is arranged according to types of narrative techniques and structural devices; it does not follow the narrative sequentially, section by section.

it appears to be one of the most polished and carefully written parts of the history, and hence is probably not typical of the whole. But only further investigation of the rest can confirm this impression.

I. STRUCTURAL DEVICES AND TECHNIQUES

Book Five as a whole was composed in two contrasting sections. The first (1.1-32.5) recounts the fall of Veii, Rome's greatest victory up to that time; the second relates her greatest defeat, the *clades Alliensis* and the sack of Rome. The two are linked by the commanding presence of Camillus, the *fatalis dux* (5.19.2). A prominent theme is that of religion: due observance of the gods brings success, neglect, disgrace and defeat. In his final speech Camillus sums up the lesson (51.5): *invenietis omnia prospera evenisse sequentibus deos, adversa spernentibus*. The symmetry of the book is further emphasized by matching Camillus' concluding speech (51-54) with the oration of Appius Claudius at the start (3-6). In the middle stands the digression on the Gallic migrations (33.2-35.3).⁹

1. The peripeteia

The chief structural device is the peripeteia. Two of them are employed. Leading up to the first is the "Affair at Clusium," the defeat at the Allia, and the beginning of the siege of the Capitol. The dominant theme is the collapse of Roman values, effort, and nerve which affects all classes of society and all departments of life. The peripeteia itself is sudden and unexpected, the contrast with the preceding events emphatically signalled:

(39.8) Nequaquam tamen ea nocte nec insequenti die similis illi quae ad Alliam tam pavide fugerat civitas fuit.

Thereafter, as a parallel and in contrast to the first part, begins the account of Rome's gradual recovery of her former military, religious, and moral strength. This chain of events leads to the second peripeteia, the sudden intervention of Camillus at the last possible moment as the ransom in gold is being weighed (49.1). The complete victory

⁹ See Burck 109-36; Ogilvie 626.

which follows is the counter-balance to the defeat at the Allia. Once again, the contrast is made explicit:

(49.5) *Igitur primo concursu haud maiore momento fusi Galli sunt quam ad Alliam vicerant.*

2. Exaggeration and Paradox

Livy takes great pains to make the contrast on either side of each peripeteia as sharp and as striking as possible. One method is by exaggeration, even to the point of paradox.¹⁰ Contrast is carried so far that on occasion Livy comes near to depicting a reversal of identity. Before the first peripeteia the Romans are more like the Gauls than themselves:

(36.1) *Mitis legatio ni praeferoces legatos Gallisque magis quam Romanis similes habuisset.*

(38.5) *In altera acie nihil simile Romanis, non apud duces, non apud milites erat.*

Similarly, Roman characteristics belong (temporarily) to the Gauls:

(38.4) *Adeo non fortuna modo sed ratio etiam cum barbaris stabat.*

But at the final denouement the reversal is complete:

(49.5) *Galli nova re trepidi arma capiunt iraque magis quam consilio in Romanos incurrunt. Iam verterat fortuna . . .*

Before the first peripeteia Roman decline is sudden, unexplained, and absolute:

No extraordinary measures are taken in face of the unknown and numerous enemy (37.1-2).

The levy is half-hearted, while the military tribunes actually belittle the danger (37.3).

At the Allia no camp is secured, no defense raised, no auspices taken, no sacrifice made, no adequate battle plan devised (38.1-2).

At the first onslaught the Romans, leaders and soldiers alike, flee "almost before they saw the unknown enemy," making no attempt to fight and not even raising a battle cry (38.6-7).

¹⁰ On the technique in general and this episode in particular, see Burck 224-26.

Part of the army is so stricken with fear that they forget their wives and children at Rome and rush off to Veii, where they post no guard and send no messenger to Rome (38.5, 9).

The other part flees at once to the city, but in such panic that they rush to the Capitol without shutting the city gates behind them (38.10).

Livy makes no real attempt to explain Roman behavior, save to invoke *fatum* (32.7, 33.1, 36.6) and *fortuna* (37.1, 38.4). During Rome's recovery and final victory, however, *fatum* is conspicuous by its absence, and *fortuna* is no longer blind or negative, but purposeful—a co-partner with divine aid and human wisdom (49.5): *Iam verterat fortuna, iam deorum opes humanaque consilia rem Romanam adiuvant.*¹¹

The plight of those in Rome as the Gauls approach after their victory at the Allia is similarly exaggerated.

The Romans fail to close the gates, station guards, or defend the walls (39.2).

The people first fill the city with cries of grief (39.4). Then, as they wait in suspense for the expected attack by the Gauls, their minds become numb with fright.

But suddenly, when the sight of the enemy entering the gates has put them beside themselves with fear, their attitude completely reverses: "Postremo lux appropinquans exanimare, timorique perpetuo ipsum malum continens fuit cum signa infesta portis sunt inlata. Nequaquam tamen ea nocte neque insequenti die similis illi quae ad Alliam tam pavide fugerat civitas fuit" (39.8).

The contrast could scarcely be more abrupt or more contrived. No explanation is given for the sudden change of heart; Livy's sole aim seems to be to achieve the sharpest possible contrast at the moment of

¹¹ Cf. I. Kajanto, *God and Fate in Livy* (Turku 1957) 58–60. The repetition *iam . . . iam*, particularly with the plpf., is used to signal climactic moments with impressive and portentous effect. The echo with the passage announcing the doom of Veii earlier in the book is doubtless deliberate: *Iam ludi Latinaeque instaurata erant, iam ex lacu Albano aqua emissa in agros, Veiosque fata adpetebant. Igitur fatalis dux ad excidium illius urbis servandaeque patriae, M. Furius Camillus . . .* (5.19.1). Cf. the fall of Alba at 1.29.4 and the impending death of Galba in Tacitus: *Iam exterritus Piso . . . iam Marius Celsus haud laeta rettulerat . . .* (*Hist.* 1.39). The device lends itself to narrative parody, as in Petronius 8.4: *Iam pro cella meretrix assem exegerat, iam ille mihi iniecerat manum, et nisi valentior fuisset, dedissem poenas.*

reversal. The peripeteia, therefore, has been created purely as a structural device.

Thereafter Roman recovery is the chief theme. Certain features here are exaggerated also:

The self-sacrifice of the patrician elders: "... viros praeter ornatum habitumque humano augustiorem, maiestate etiam quam voltus gravitasque oris prae se ferebat simillimos dis. Ad eos velut simulacra versi . . ." (41.8-9).

The daring act of Fabius Dorsuo as the Gauls looked on and did nothing: "seu attonitis Gallis miraculo audaciae seu religione etiam motis" (46.3).

The complex and dangerous procedure of nominating Camillus dictator in conformity to all constitutional niceties: "adeo regebat omnia pudor discriminaque rerum prope perditis rebus servabant" (46.7).

The reward to Manilius on the Capitol of extra food, despite near-starvation (47.8).

The peripeteia which follows also illustrates Livy's desire to achieve balanced structure at the expense of probability. While Camillus is joining his forces at Veii and Ardea and is equipping and training them, the desperate situation on the Capitol forces the Romans to offer a ransom in gold to the Gauls (48.5-8). Camillus with his whole army intervenes suddenly. How they were able to enter the forum unseen and unchallenged by the Gauls is not explained. The peripeteia thus makes exciting reading, but little sense.¹² The reversal is completed by Camillus' immediate victory amid the rubble of the city and his second victory on the Via Gabinia, where not a single Gaul survived to report the disaster (49.6).

Livy has thus deliberately created a black and white contrast on both sides of each peripeteia. Rome's decline and defeat could scarcely be more absolute, her recovery more pronounced, the final reversal more surprising.

3. Leitmotif

Livy makes it clear that the disaster at the Allia was not caused solely, or even chiefly, by military mistakes; it was the result of moral

¹² See Burck 221-22 for similar techniques in Hellenistic historiography.

guilt, religious neglect, and political folly on the part of all classes: leaders, Senate, and people. The military mistakes are therefore explicable only in terms of the general failure. The neglect and the subsequent recovery of "human and divine" aid is thus the chief theme. It is introduced at the start in the form of two prefatory anecdotes: the disregard of the divine voice on the Nova Via which warned of the approach of the Gauls (32.6-7), and the exile of Camillus: *expulso cive quo manente, si quicquam humanorum certi est, capi Roma non potuerat . . .* (32.8-33.1).¹³ A simple statement of theme links the two:

Neque deorum modo monita ingruente fato spreta, sed humanam quoque opem, quae una erat, M. Furium ab urbe amovere (32.7).

"Gods and men" becomes thereafter a leitmotif which appears at each crucial stage of the story, the repetition reinforcing and unifying the basic structure. At the Allia:

Non deorum saltem, si non hominum memores (38.1).

Introducing the first reversal:

Placuit . . . deos hominesque et Romanum nomen defendere (39.9-10).

When Roman fortunes begin to recover:

Salvo etiam tum discrimine divinarum humanarumque rerum (40.10).

Introducing the second reversal:

Sed dique et homines prohibuere redemptos vivere Romanos (49.1).

At the point of final victory:

Iam deorum opes humanaque consilia rem Romanam adiuvabant (49.5).

Finally, the two prefatory anecdotes are recalled in the aftermath and are united: first, when Camillus orders a temple to Aius Locutius to be built on the Nova Via (50.5), and second, in his great speech which closes the pentad (51.7, 52.1).

¹³ The use of a prefatory anecdote, chiefly to foreshadow and to characterize, appears elsewhere: e.g., the story of the young Hannibal swearing eternal enmity to Rome at the start of the third decade (21.1.4-5); note that in Polybius it is delayed considerably (3.11.5-12.6). Compare the anecdote of the centurion before the senate-house which concludes Book Five: *hic manebimus optime* (55.2); the advice was taken (*senatus accipere se nomen . . . conclamavit et plebs circumfusa adprobavit*), and contrasts with the unheeded voice on the Nova Via.

4. *Terrarum orbi documento*

The events before and after the first peripeteia are contrasted most strongly in the themes of moral collapse and regeneration. Livy takes great pains to make the contrast as forceful and thorough-going as possible.

After the two prefatory anecdotes, the "Affair at Clusium" recounts the moral guilt incurred by the Fabian ambassadors: *Legati contra ius gentium arma capiunt* (36.6). The idea is repeated twice more in as many pages: *pro iure gentium violato* (36.8), *violatoribus iuris humani* (37.4), and is picked up by Camillus in his last speech: *gentium ius ab legatis nostris violatum* (51.7, cf. 6.1.6). The disapproval of the Senate is noted (36.9-10), and the historian puts his own opinion on record: *haud secus quam dignum erat infensi Galli* (36.11). At the same time he is at pains to show that the defeat at the Allia was not a case of the sins of the Fabii being visited upon the state. The Senate and the people are implicated also. When the Gauls demand satisfaction, the Senate deplores the violation and admits the justice of their demands. But political favoritism (*ambitio*) for the Fabii prevails.¹⁴ In order to avoid responsibility for a possible future defeat (36.9-10), decision is passed to the people, among whom the influence and wealth (*gratia atque opes*) of the Fabii is so great that the three are elected military tribunes with consular power for the coming year (36.10-11). The state as a whole is thereby involved in moral guilt, as Camillus makes clear in his final speech (51.7).

This theme thus accounts for the division of material on each side of the first reversal: Senate, leaders, and people are treated each in turn.

In the first part the Senate shirks its duty and is therefore responsible by default; in the second it redeems itself by the sacrifice of its elder statesmen. Their intention to atone for their failure earlier to set the plebs a good example is made explicit (39.13).

Roman leadership is a second theme of contrast. In the face of an

¹⁴ In Plutarch's version the majority of senators is described as denouncing Q. Fabius (*Cam.* 18.1) and the blame is laid almost exclusively on the people (18.2). Dio-dorus (14.113) goes so far as to depict the Senate voting to hand over Q. Fabius to the Gauls, but being overruled by the people (cited as the first example of the people overruling the Senate).

unknown enemy who had "stirred up war from the Ocean and the furthest shores of the world,"

civitas, quae adversus Fidenatem ac Veientem hostem aliosque finitimos populos ultima experiens auxilia dictatorem multis tempestatibus dixisset, . . . nihil extraordinarii imperii aut auxilii quaesivit (37.1-2).

Contrasted with this is the appointment of Camillus as dictator (46.10), as well as the help of the Latins (46.4) and the Ardeates (43.6-45.3, 48.5). In the first part the three Fabii forget their status as ambassadors; in the sequel the centurion at Veii, Q. Caedicius, rejects any thought of himself leading the troops to Rome and is the first to ask for Camillus as dictator (*ipse memor ordinis sui*: 46.6), while the appointment of Camillus conforms to every constitutional requirement despite great danger, involved procedure, and the "well-nigh desperate state of affairs" (46.7); moreover, the historian is sure his hero did not set out from Ardea to Veii before the actual news of his appointment was given him, *quod nec iniussu populi mutari finibus posset nec nisi dictator dictus auspicia in exercitu habere* (46.11). Similarly, the *temeritas* of the Fabii (37.3) balances the actions of the Romans on the Capitol: *nihil temere nec trepide* (43.2). Failure to hold an accurate levy (37.3) parallels Camillus' levy at Ardea (48.5). Failure to secure a campsite or defensive rampart at the Allia (38.1) corresponds to the Roman defense of the Capitol: *ad omnes aditus stationibus firmatis* (43.2), as well as the death penalty meted out to one negligent guard (47.10). Finally, failure to anticipate the nature of the Gallic attack, *extenuantes etiam famam belli* (37.3, cf. 38.1-2) balances Camillus' strategic foresight in the night attack on the Gauls at Ardea, for it turned out *sicut praedictum erat* (45.2).

The third group, the people, are responsible for the election of the Fabii as military tribunes, panic on the field of battle, and disorder and confusion in the aftermath. In the second half, when they flee the city as the Gauls approach, L. Albinus, *de plebe homo*, orders his wife and children from his wagon in order to carry the Vestals and the *sacra* to Caere. Confusion and panic no longer prevail: *nihil tamen tot onerati atque obruti malis flexerunt animos* (42.7).

The loss and recapture of divine aid is a counterpart to that of human help. The warning voice on the Nova Via was ignored, the violation

of *ius gentium* went unpunished (cf. 51.7), while at the Allia the auspices were not taken nor a sacrifice made (38.1). In the second half great attention is given to strict religious observance: the care of sacred objects by the Flamen Quirinalis and the Vestals; the anecdote about L. Albinus; the story of Fabius Dorsuo's daring journey through enemy lines to perform a family sacrifice: *satis sperans propitios esse deos quorum cultum ne mortis quidem metu prohibitus deseruisset* (46.3); sparing the sacred geese of Juno on the Capitol despite the lack of food, *quae res saluit fuit* (47.4). Divine aid is on the Roman side at the final victory (49.1, 5), and in the aftermath the religious theme is strongly emphasized both in the acts of Camillus, *diligentissimus religionum cultor* (50.1), and in his final speech:

Tam evidens numen hac tempestate rebus adfuit Romanis ut omnem neglegentiam divini cultus exemptam hominibus putem (51.4).

Livy's desire to teach a moral lesson is clearly responsible for the selection, ordering, and emphasis of material. The narrative corresponds to the programme announced in the Preface: "The chief merit and benefit of history is to behold in the record of a great nation examples of every sort of conduct; from it you may select for yourself and for your country those things worthy of imitation and those which, whether wrongly begun or wrongly concluded, you should avoid."¹⁵ This paradigmatic view of history is implicit throughout in the choice and treatment of material (cf. 40.10, 46.7). In his concluding speech Camillus passes in review the chief *exempla vitiorum et virtutum* which the state had just beheld. He also reiterates forcefully the sentiments of the Preface:

Igitur victi captique ac redempti tantum poenarum dis hominibusque dedimus ut terrarum orbi documento essemus (51.8).

Yet it is the first peripeteia at 39.8 which testifies most clearly to Livy's decision to structure his material as he did. One might have expected him to make the defeat at the Allia central and pivotal. But he did not. The Allia was merely one of a series of events which were

¹⁵ Praef. 10: *Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites.* On the meaning of *monumentum* see Ogilvie 28.

foedum inceptu, foedum exitu; the *clades* itself was accordingly reduced in importance and made to take its proper place in the grand design (see section 6 below).

Yet the balancing series of *exempla virtutum* needed an introduction of *some* sort. Hence the peripeteia. It is true that it is sudden, unexplained, and unmotivated; but since it was created solely as an introductory device, for Livy to have searched out or manufactured an immediate cause for the Roman change of heart would serve no really useful purpose. It would contribute nothing to the lesson, and might impair the economy of structure and the narrative pace. What would be gained, in fact? Nothing, except a certain specious verisimilitude (see Part III below).

5. Methods of narration

The first peripeteia allows Livy to create a structure based essentially on thematic contrasts. No event is presented as climactic or as important solely as a piece of action. The things which happen are not closely connected circumstantially; they are treated as a series of "closed wholes" (Witte's *Einzel Erzählungen*), narrated as *exempla*, and arranged around a central dividing point. The rather chiasmic nature of the design is somewhat static in conception. It would seem unsuited for narrating what is, after all, a linear progression of events through time.

But, of course, the story does move forward and great changes do come about. Hence the second reversal at 49.1, which is solely the product of "action," and whose only function is to make exciting reading. What Livy has done, in fact, in the last half of Book Five, is to blend two disparate approaches to the narration of events. It cannot have been an easy task. But the finished product is clearly successful. There is little feeling of incongruity. Nor is the transition obvious; indeed, it is impossible to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. This is because after the first reversal Livy uses the series of *exempla virtutum* both as a foil to the events of the first half and as pieces of action increasingly important simply as action, building in a temporal sequence to a climax of pure "situation." Hence the differing treatment of material in the various parts of the

story. The account of Rome's recovery takes over twice as much space as that of her decline (omitting the digression on the Gauls). Events before the first reversal are brief and not particularized; the only participant named is Q. Fabius, and this only because Livy could not resist pointing to an example of *peregrina virtus* (36.6) on the battlefield at Clusium.¹⁶ The succeeding part is much different; anecdotal *exempla* abound, generalized description is reduced, and individual exploits are detailed: the self-sacrifice of the elders (with individuals named: M. Folius at 41.3 and M. Papirius at 41.9), the religious piety of L. Albinus (40.9-10) and of C. Fabius Dorsuo (46.1-3), Camillus at Ardea (43.6-45.3), Q. Caedicius at Veii (45.4-8, 46.6), Pontius Cominus' journey (46.8-11), M. Manlius on the Capitol (47.1-11), Q. Sulpicius (47.9-10, 48.8-9), and Camillus' final victory (49.1-7).

6. Expansion, omission, subordination

Livy's picture of Roman decline before the first reversal is uniformly black, and is described only in general terms; everything (save Q. Fabius' *peregrina virtus*) which did not contribute to this was omitted. Hence various episodes in the parallel accounts of Diodorus, Plutarch, and Dionysius find no place in Livy: for example, the speech to the people by the father of the Fabian ambassadors urging rejection of the Gallic demand for satisfaction (Diod. 14.113); the recommendation of the fetial priests that the ambassadors be surrendered (Plut. *Cam.* 18); the preparations made by the Gauls for a night attack on the Capitol (Dion. Hal. 13.7-8; Plut. *Cam.* 26-27). A speech by the elder Fabius is necessary only because in Diodorus' version the Senate acquiesces in the Gallic demands for handing over of the chief offender, Q. Fabius. But since Livy wants to stress the implication in guilt of *all* elements in the state, he has the Senate refuse to make any recommendation; a speech by the elder Fabius can thus be dispensed with. The fetial priests are excluded from the story on similar grounds: Roman decline must be total, even in matters of religion. Finally, to detail the preparations of the Gauls for a night attack on the Capitol would only distract from the central focus: the recovery of Roman spirit.

¹⁶ Compare the treatment of Flaminius in Books 21-22. Despite bad character, neglect of religion, and foolhardiness (e.g., 21.63, 22.1, 3-4), he displayed great *virtus* on the battlefield at Lake Trasimene (22.5-6).

Before the first peripeteia Livy feels free to dwell at some length on Gallic psychology (39.1-3) and attitudes (36.8-10). But not afterward, when events are told almost entirely from the Roman point of view.¹⁷

Since the *clades Alliensis* comes before the first peripeteia and is designed primarily as one of a number of episodes illustrating Rome's moral decline, Livy has chosen not to make it climactic or pivotal.¹⁸ Patriotic feeling doubtless contributed to this decision as well. The account of the battle is accordingly quite brief (38.1-10); it requires as much space to bring the combatants to the site (37.1-8), and as much to narrate their dispersal (39.1-8). Moreover, after first adverting to the preparations of the Romans (or the lack of them: 38.1-2) and of the Gauls (38.3-4), and then returning to the Romans again (*in altera acie* . . . : 38.5), he abandons the temporal sequence. By stating baldly the outcome (38.5) he forestalls any attempt to build to a climax; then, as if in retrospect, he sketches in briefest outline what generally befell the Romans on the field (38.6-8).¹⁹ The magnitude of the disaster is cleverly underplayed. To be sure, *magna strages facta est* (38.8), but no numbers are given, and we read immediately: *armis abiectis totum sinistrum cornu defugit . . . maxima tamen pars incolumis Veios perfugit* (39.9), and then *ab dextro cornu . . . Romam omnes petiere* (38.10). There seems little left to constitute the *magna strages*. Moreover, the fight itself is leached of all interest or excitement:

Simul est clamor proximis ab latere, ultimis ab tergo auditus, ignotum hostem prius paene quam viderent, non modo non temptato certamine sed ne clamore quidem reddito integri intactique fugerunt (38.6).

This colorless account of one of the best known episodes in Roman history is remarkable. And daring. Indeed, it is something of a

¹⁷ When their reactions are noted, they are used to point up Roman *virtus*: e.g., their reactions to Dorsuo's daring act of *pietas* (46.1-3).

¹⁸ H. Bruckmann's treatment of the Allia, *Die römischen Niederlagen im Geschichtswerk des T. Livius* (Munster 1936) 41-44, is disappointing and unsatisfactory because he discusses the defeat alone (35.4-39.2 only) and fails to see how it relates to the narrative which precedes and follows. This proves doubly unfortunate, since Bruckmann selects the Allia as one of three archetypal patterns for Roman defeats in general.

¹⁹ His account is quite close to that found in Diodorus, as Schachermeyr 292-94 and Ogilvie 719 note. But Livy's compression results in some puzzles and inconsistencies (noted by Schachermeyr).

tour-de-force, for in effect Livy denies that there was any battle at all: *Nec ulla caedes pugnantium fuit*.²⁰

Events leading up to the second peripeteia are narrated chiefly to create suspense. It is characteristic of Livy to delay the moment of reversal as long as possible. In certain shorter episodes this takes the form of what can be termed the "*nisi*-technique": i.e., Livy pushes the reversal not only to the brink of disaster, but a bit over the edge: "The worst was in the process of happening, had not..."²¹ A similar technique is also used on a large scale. The last third of Book Five not only is designed to create this effect as a whole, but is itself composed in part of smaller such units. The self-sacrifice of the elders (41.1-10) is an illustration. Their preliminary preparations are given swiftly, with economy, and in the past tense. The arrival of the Gauls in the forum, which sets the scene in the historic present (*in forum perveniunt*), marks the first step leading to the climax. Excitement is generated by giving the psychological reactions of the Gauls to the sights they see or imagine. The verbs continue in the historic present: *ruunt, petunt*. The confrontation is delayed as long as possible: arrival at the Colline Gate, gathering in the forum, dispersal for booty, return to the forum, hesitant glances into the open doors of the patrician houses, the final entrance. Note that verisimilitude is sacrificed for the sake of suspenseful delay. When the Gauls first scatter for booty, we must suppose that in passing by the doors of the patrician houses they either deign not to notice them or choose not to. The climax is further delayed by noting every step in their approach after their return to the forum: *cunctatio tenebat... invadendi...; haud secus quam venerabundi intuebantur in aedium vestibulis sedentes viros...; ad eos velut simulacra versi cum starent...*²² The account of the actual assault is very brief;

²⁰ Cf. E. Burck's remarks, *Die Welt als Geschichte* 1 (1935) 473 = *Wege zu Livius*, ed. E. Burck (Darmstadt 1967) 126-27.

²¹ E.g. 2.47.8: *Romanos terror per tota castra trepidos agit, et ad extrema ventum foret ni legati raptō consulis corpore patefecissent una porta hostibus viam*; or 3.1.4: *atrox certamen aderat, ni Fabius consilio neutri parti acerbō rem expedisset*. See further Burck 215; H. Hoch, *Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms bei Livius* (Frankfurt 1951) 19 ff.; R. Jumeau (above, note 5) 23-24.

²² Burck 202, note 1 sees a contradiction in that Livy speaks of a number of houses (*in aedium vestibulis*), but the final scene can take place in only one. It would seem most natural (though not mandatory) so to view the final scene. Plutarch's version (*Cam.* 21-22) puts all the elders together in the open forum where the Gauls could not possibly

Augustan sensibilities as well as the historian's own predilection forbade scenes of blood and carnage. Furthermore, the climax has been reached at the point when the first blow is struck; elaboration would be anticlimactic and would contribute nothing further to the effect or the point of the episode. Hence the conclusion is swift (41.10): *post principum caedem nulli deinde mortalium parci, diripi tecta, exhaustis inici ignes*.

The same technique operates on a larger scale as events build to the second peripeteia. The episodes involved were complex not only in number and variety, but also because attention must focus on three different places at once: Rome, Veii, and Ardea. Although Livy normally strives for unity of time and place (see below), here he accepts and even exploits the complexity in order to prolong the suspense and heighten the excitement.²³ After the first peripeteia a lengthy scene at Rome is devoted to the (now) exemplary behavior of senators, plebeians and leaders. The scene then moves to Camillus at Ardea (43.6):²⁴

Proficiscentes Gallos ab urbe . . . fortuna ipsa Ardeam ubi Camillus exsulabat duxit . . .

Then to Veii (45.4):

Similis in agro Veienti Tuscorum facta strages est . . .

Back to Rome for the episode of Fabius Dorsuo (46.1):

Romae interim . . . repente iuvenis Romanus . . .

Then to Veii and the decision to appoint Camillus dictator (46.4):

Veii interim non animi tantum in dies sed etiam vires crescebant . . .

have overlooked them on first gathering. This, together with the apparent contradiction, suggests that Livy himself may have transferred them to their respective houses in order to delay the confrontation, although he narrated the last scene as if the elders were all together.

²³ Burck 218 notes that Livy uses a similar technique to create suspense when switching from events *domi* to events *militiae*.

²⁴ Since he does not want Camillus' victory at Ardea to overshadow the final reversal, Livy has Camillus sketch the battle plan and foretell its outcome in a speech to the Ardeates. The encounter itself can thus be reduced to a few lines. The subsequent victory at Veii under the centurion Q. Caedicius cannot, in turn, be allowed to overshadow Camillus' exploit (45.4-8). Hence it is narrated very summarily, and the centurion firmly "put in his place": *par Camillo defuit auctor*.

Back to Rome for the episode of Manlius and the geese (47.1):

Dum haec Veii agebantur, interim arx Romae . . .

That Livy is here deliberately exploiting "division by place" is shown by his making the Dorsuo exploit into a separate episode; it could easily have been included in the first scene at Rome (39.9 ff.) or in the next (47.1 ff.).

From 47.1 on the scene remains focussed on the Capitol, where famine and exhaustion lead to the final decision to capitulate. The hopelessness of the situation is brought home forcibly in a masterful periodic sentence of great length. For the last time the reader glimpses the proceedings at Ardea and Veii, but they seem too late. The steady piling up of participial and adjectival phrases, combined with numerous subordinate clauses, reinforces the long waiting and ultimate exhaustion (48.5-7):

Itaque dum dictator dilectum per se Ardeae habet, magistrum equitum L. Valerium a Veii adducere exercitum iubet, parat instruitque quibus haud impar adoriatur hostes, interim Capitolinus exercitus, stationibus vigiliis fessus, superatis tamen humanis omnibus malis cum famem unam natura vinci non sineret, diem de die prospectans ecquod auxilium ab dictatore appareret, postremo spe quoque iam non solum cibo deficiente et cum stationes procederent prope obruentibus infirmum corpus armis, vel dedi vel redimi se quacumque pactione possent iussit, iactantibus non obscure Gallis haud magna mercede se adduci posse ut obsidionem relinquunt.

The senate is thus forced to treat for peace. The gold is weighed out. While the tribune futilely protests, a Gaul insolently throws his sword on the scale, *auditaque intoleranda Romanis vox, Vae victis*. Livy can postpone the reversal no longer:

Sed dique et homines prohibuere redemptos vivere Romanos. Nam forte quadam priusquam infanda merces perficeretur . . .

The climax has been reached and the goal achieved. Livy characteristically ends the story as rapidly as decency will allow. In fifteen lines he recounts two battles and a triumph. In effect the intervention itself and this "conclusion" form a single unit by virtue of their brevity and the continued use of verbs in the historic present. The

manner in which Livy builds to and concludes the reversal reveals, perhaps better than any other passage, how much skill and self-discipline he exercised in composition. The subject matter immediately preceding the peripeteia was complex and inviting: the pestilence which attacked the Gauls (48.1-3); the first futile attempt at negotiation (48.4); the hurried levy at Ardea; the final last days on the Capitol, made terrible by famine, despair, and exhaustion; the difficult decision to offer ransom; the concluding scene of capitulation, with all its pathos, ignominy, and final insult. The material offered an almost unparalleled opportunity to indulge in a kind of writing of which he was particularly fond: crowd psychology, speeches, and "tragic" scenes of pity and fear. Moreover, the concluding events must have tempted him to glorify at length one of his favorite heroes—Camillus—and his favorite heroine—Rome. But Livy yielded to none of these temptations. His skill as a narrator is seldom shown to better advantage than in what he chose not to say.

Particularly characteristic is his habit of introducing and concluding episodes as quickly as possible. Sometimes a mere phrase suffices for transition; *forte quadam, repente, per eos forte dies, interim*, and the like are frequent. The technique operates on a very large scale as well. For example, he plunges *in medias res* almost at once at the start of the Hannibalic War in Book 21, and concludes the decade so swiftly that Scipio's famous triumph (*omnium clarissimus*: 30.45.2) is described quite sketchily (compare Appian's fuller account at *Pun.* 66).²⁵ Occasionally, however, at the start of a grand sequence of events which requires a large canvass and generous treatment, Livy will vary his practice. Hence the placement of the excursus on the Gallic migrations. It is not merely a *diverticulum amoenum* (9.17.1), nor a vehicle to display the results of historical research, nor the conscientious fulfillment of the ethnographical digression which was traditional in ancient historiography. The "Affair at Clusium" is carefully gotten under way (and in the historic present) *before* the excursus is inserted (33.1):

Expulso cive quo manente, si quicquam humanorum certi est, capi Roma

²⁵ On the technique in general see Walsh 178-79; Münzer 340; Burck 183 and note 1; Witte *passim*, esp. 290-92, 299-301, 370-77. Failure to sketch necessary background material at the start of new enterprises has brought justified criticism: e.g., Syme (above, note 2) 148, on the start of Book 31 and Rome's entrance into eastern affairs.

non potuerat, adventante fatali urbi clade legati ab Clusinis veniunt auxilium adversus Gallos petentes. Eam gentem traditur fama . . .

Hence the digression serves in part the purpose of delaying the (announced) end of the story and of whetting the reader's interest in this *invisitato atque inaudito hoste, ab Oceano terrarumque ultimis oris bellum ciente* (37.2).²⁶

7. The Unities

Normally Livy tries to achieve as much coherence and simplicity as he can in his narrative; this is particularly true for unity of time and of place.²⁷ At times this takes the form of straightforward telescoping, at others of glossing over and blurring in order to gain greater cohesion and simplicity.

In the versions of Polybius (2.18), Diodorus (14.115), and Plutarch (*Cam.* 22) the Gauls do not arrive in Rome until the fourth day after the Allia.²⁸ Livy brings them to the city gates on the very afternoon of the disaster (39.2): *haud multo ante solis occasum ad urbem Romam perveniunt*.²⁹ This produces a tightly-knit story, but creates difficulties. The Gauls on arriving invest the neighborhood (39.3): *exploratoribus missis circa moenia aliasque portas*. But before they enter the gates the following events occur: the Romans decide to defend the Capitol and proceed to make necessary preparations, the emotional scene of separation takes place, the plebs including Albinus and the Vestals flee to surrounding towns (apparently while the Gauls looked on), and the elders have time to prepare themselves for sacrifice and to take their places in the houses surrounding the forum. The end of the story is similarly treated. According to one tradition the siege of the Capitol

²⁶ See Ogilvie's remarks 700-701. Bayet's belief that the excursus is a later insertion is ill-founded: *Tite-Live Livre V* (Paris 1954) 96, 157-58. Compare the inclusion and the placement of the digression on the *vallum* just before the decisive engagement at Cynoscephalae is joined (33.5.5-12 = Polybius 18.18); Livy usually omits or sharply curtails this type of Polybian material (see Walsh 158 for examples).

²⁷ See Witte 359-68.

²⁸ See Walbank 2.18.2 note. Wolski (44) is surely mistaken in believing this to be the preservation of an authentic detail; cf. Ogilvie's remarks, 720.

²⁹ Not two days and two nights as Burck 126 understands it. Weissenborn, 5.39.2 note, rightly notes that *insequenti die* of 39.8 means the day after the Allia and that *lux appropinquans* refers to the same day.

lasted seven months. Livy gives no hint of time, except that it was long enough to produce near starvation. But why the Gauls, who were doing the investing, should also have been afflicted with famine is not made clear (48.1), nor is Camillus' delay month after month at Ardea accounted for.

It has been noted above that in order to create suspense and narrative excitement Livy made the exploit of Fabius Dorsuo into an episode separate from the others which occur at the site of Rome. His usual practice, however, is to eliminate such separate scenes. For example, the story opens at Clusium (33.1), is interrupted by the digression on the Gauls, and resumes again at Clusium (35.4). But the Clusine embassy to Rome, which comes next, requires three shifts: Clusium—Rome—Clusium. In order not to expand or complicate unnecessarily he avoids any real scene in Rome by first stating that the three Fabii were dispatched to Clusium and by then giving as if in retrospect the instructions of the Senate (partly in a *qui* clause, partly in *oratio obliqua*). In effect, a scene at Rome is eliminated. The impression is further reinforced by the tenses; all verbs following the resumption of the story after the digression are in the past tense until we are settled in Clusium for the main scene: *quibus* [sc. *legatis*] *postquam mandata ediderunt in concilio datur responsum . . .* (36.1). A similar device is used at the site of Veii (46.4–11) when Caedicius and his men vote to summon Camillus from Ardea, but not before Pontius Cominus can make a journey to Rome in order to secure Camillus' election. The procedure was involved: it entailed originating the idea at Veii, sending Cominus to Rome, returning him to Veii, and then forwarding a message to Camillus at Ardea to inform him of his election. Livy's intention to retain as much unity of place as possible is clear, for *Veii* *interim* begins the section and *dum haec Veii agebantur, interim arx Romae* begins the next. Hence the journey of Cominus is given in short, simple sentences and in the historic present: it is not described in stages or separate scenes (the usual practice: see below), but follows Cominus continuously throughout the trip: *inde . . . et . . . inde*. The "scene" at Rome is relegated to an ablative absolute (*accepto inde senatus consulto uti . . .*), and a participle suffices for sending legates to Camillus at Ardea. But further difficulties are involved; since Livy prefers to believe that Camillus did not set out from Ardea until the

lex curiata was actually enacted, Pontius would have had to take *two* journeys, the second to relay the actual passing of the law.

8. Division and division "headings"

The most characteristic feature of Livy's narrative technique is the division of material into separate units based on groups of people, stages in a developing sequence of events, themes, or differing places.³⁰ He seldom narrates events as a continuous, uninterrupted sequence; only when aiming at a special effect, such as that concerning the journey of Pontius Cominus, does he violate this fixed technique of composition. Action is narrated in discrete scenes as in a stage-play, rather than following it continuously as in the manner of a movie camera. The technique is everywhere present in the *Ab Urbe Condita*, operating both on a very small and on a very large scale.

Its use on a small scale functions chiefly to mark the developing stages in action or to divide a large group into smaller units so that both actions of individuals and the general course of events can be easily conceived and followed. An example of the former is at 39.1-2, describing the reactions of the Gauls after their victory at the Allia: *ipsi pavore defixi primum steterunt, . . . deinde insidias vereri . . . , postremo caesorum spolia legere . . . , tum demum . . . ad urbem Roman perveniunt*. In parallel fashion the reactions of the Romans after the same event are thus described (39.4 ff.): *Romani cum pars maior . . . privatos deinde . . . mox ululatus . . . omne inde tempus . . . ; and beginning a new sequence: primo adventu . . . deinde sub occasum solis . . . tum in noctem . . . postremo lux appropinquans*. An example of division by group is at 40.4 ff., which describes the actions of those in Rome as the Gauls approach: *magna pars tamen earum [sc. mulierum] in arcem suos persecutae sunt . . . alia maxime plebis turba . . . petit Ianiculum. Inde pars per agros dilapsi, pars urbes petunt finitimas*. At the Allia (38.9-10) the parallel division between *pars incolumis Veios perfugit* and *ab dextro cornu . . . Romam omnes petiere* is reinforced by *ne . . . quidem* phrases in each division: *ne nuntius quidem . . . , ne clausis quidem portis* (cf. 41.5).

The *Einzel erzählungen* which Witte first noted are the result of the same narrative technique operating on a larger scale. Thus we find

³⁰ See Walsh 185-96; Burck 182-95; Witte *passim*, esp. 288-305, 368-80.

"The Affair at Clusium," "Manlius and the Geese," "Camillus' Victory at Ardea," and so forth. But equally pervasive and significant is a division technique intermediate between the *Einzel Erzählung* and the short passage of a few lines. In this group division is based on persons and places more often than on themes or temporal sequence. In most cases the first words of each division form a kind of "heading" which functions like modern boldfaced type used to mark topics and sub-topics. Once the basis for division had been determined (e.g., groups or places), Livy usually adhered to the appropriate "heading" throughout; he seldom abandoned the basis for division until it came to a natural end, or mixed different types together. The "Affair at Clusium" is divided as follows (the principle of division being the group):

1. "*Clusini novo bello exterriti . . .*": the plight of Clusium (35.4).
2. "*Mitis legatio, ni . . .*": violation of *ius gentium* by the Roman legates (36.1).
3. "*Tribuni quorum temeritate bellum contractum . . .*": The Romans prepare for the Allia (37.3).
4. "*Interim Galli . . .*": the Gauls do likewise (37.4).
5. "*Ibi tribuni militum . . .*": the Romans at the site of the Allia (38.1).
6. "*Nam Brennus regulus Gallorum . . .*": the Gauls at the Allia (38.3).
7. "*In altera acie nihil simile Romanis . . .*": the defeat itself (38.5).
8. "*Gallos quoque . . .*": reaction of the Gauls to victory (39.1).
9. "*Romani, cum pars maior . . .*": reaction of the Romans to defeat (39.4).

Once one becomes aware of such "headings" they fairly leap to the eye; at times they can seem somewhat obtrusive and mechanical. After the first peripeteia Livy recounts the plans which the Romans make for their defense. The plan is given first for the defense of the Capitol (39.9-10), second for the preservation of religious rites and objects (39.11), and third for the self-sacrifice of the elders (39.12-13). The following sections recount, in the same order, how each of these decisions was carried out:

1. *Versae inde adhortationes ad agmen iuvenum quos in Capitolium . . .* (40.1).
2. *Flamen interim Quirinalis virginesque Vestales . . .* (40.7).
3. *Romae interim . . . turba seniorum . . .* (40.1).

The last division serves as both the conclusion to the previous section and the introduction to the last unit before the second reversal; the division is based on place. Hence, picking up the previous section:

3. *Romae* interim . . .³¹
4. *Proficiscentes Gallos ab urbe . . . fortuna ipsa Ardeam ubi Camillus exsulabat duxit . . .* (43.6).
5. *Similis in agro Veienti* Tuscorum facta strages est . . . (45.4).
6. *Romae* interim . . . (46.1).
7. *Veis* interim . . . (46.4).
8. *Dum haec Veis agebantur, interim arx Romae . . .* (47.1).

9. Style

Livy employs various stylistic devices to give shape and design to his narrative. "Division headings" are one example. His treatment of short, self-contained sequences in which action and movement predominate is another. In this kind of episode sentences of transition or of introduction are customarily brief and given in a past tense (the pluperfect is common). Sentences preliminary to the main piece of action are regularly periodic, lengthy, and also given in a past tense (but these seldom in the pluperfect); they are also few in number—often one will suffice. As the action gains momentum the sentences shorten, parataxis becomes frequent, and the historic present often appears. If the action becomes particularly violent or hurried the sentences may reduce to only a few words apiece and historic infinitives take over. The self-sacrifice of the elders has already been cited in another connection for some of these characteristics. Save for Livy's brief interjection of a variant version at 41.3, two complex sentences set the scene: *expectabant . . . sedere* (third pl. perf.). Historic presents take over when the action speeds up: *perveniant . . . ruunt . . . petunt*. When the pace slows temporarily past tenses reappear (*redibant . . . tenebant*), before the action builds to a second and greater climax in historic infinitives: *parci . . . diripi . . . inici*.³² The episode of Manlius and the geese (47.1-6), as Walsh has observed, is another

³¹ Further subdivided into *Romani ex arce . . .* (42.3) and *Galli quoque per aliquot dies . . .* (43.1).

³² See also the first abortive attack by the Gauls on the Capitol (43.1-2), Camillus' victory at Ardea (45.1-3), and Pontius Cominus' journey to Rome (46.8-10).

illustration.³³ A brief sentence serves as transition and introduction, given in a past tense: *dum haec Veiis agebantur . . . fuit*. The actions of the Gauls preliminary to the main scene come next in a lengthy periodic sentence: *Namque Galli . . . evasere*. A brief sentence denotes the reversal: *anserēs non fefellere . . . quae res saluti fuit*. The next division concentrates on Manlius and his acts: *M. Manlius . . . vadit . . . deturbat . . . trucidat*. The sentences then become even shorter and historic infinitives take over: *proturbare . . . deferri*. The conclusion is given in a single short sentence and in a past tense: *quieti datum est*.

But style is not confined to reinforcing sense chiefly or solely in such "action" sequences. It has been noted how the lengthy and complex sentences describing the conditions which forced the Romans on the Capitol to treat for peace reflects the length of the siege and the exhaustion of the defenders. And style is also used to structure much larger units. The "Affair at Clusium" is an illustration. The events involved in this sequence are numerous and complex. Involved are four shifts in locality (Clusium—Rome—Clusium—Rome), and extended length of time, four different meetings (two of the Roman Senate, one of a Roman assembly, one of the Gallic council), three embassies, an argument about policy among the Gallic chieftains, and a battle. Livy tackles the task of narration simply and directly. Since for his purposes the most significant single event in this section is the violation of *ius gentium*,³⁴ he makes it the focal point. He does this not by dwelling on the act itself (the fact of violation is stated in a few words, followed by a brief comment on its most flagrant feature), but by causing two different narrative styles to meet at the point which he wishes most to emphasize (36.6). Prior events are therefore introductory in nature and are given summarily. Four lengthy sentences covering a page of text are needed to give the preliminaries. The first and last (35.4, 36.5) are hypotactic and periodic. The second (35.5–6) is a series of brief phrases forming a single stylistic unit which is asyndetic, paratactic, and elliptical, with both a verb to introduce *oratio obliqua* and all auxiliary verbs (*impetratum*, *missi*) omitted. The third sentence (36.1–4) is of great length and combines both hypotaxis (*ni*, *quibus*, *etsi*, or. obl., *quorum*, *quoniam*, *si*, *quam*, *si*, *ut*) and

³³ 250–51.

³⁴ The "telos": Burck 184.

parataxis (*et, et*). Variety is thus achieved (four long sentences all paratactic or hypotactic would have been monotonous), but together they form a prefatory unit by virtue of their length and great compression. Indeed, Livy has compressed so drastically that at 35.4 we read of the Clusini that *nullum eis ius societatis amicitiaeve erat*, whereas in the next sentence the Senate warns the Gauls *ne . . . socios populi Romani atque amicos oppugnarent*. His method of avoiding in this section a separate scene in Rome has been noted above. The violation of *ius gentium* is thrown into relief when the long sentences of introduction are broken by a simple statement in the historic present: *Ibi iam urgentibus Romanam urbem fatis legati contra ius gentium arma capiunt* (36.6). Each important stage in the action which follows is given briefly in the historic present; each of these in turn is followed by one or more equally brief statements in a past tense which elaborates what has been said in the historic present:

1. *legati . . . arma capiunt / potuit . . . eminebat.*
2. *Q. Fabius . . . ducem Gallorum . . . occidit / agnovere . . . datum est.*
3. *receptui canunt / erant qui . . . vicere . . . placebat . . . videbantur . . . obstabat.*
4. *ad populum reiciunt / plus gratia atque opes valere.*
5. *infensi Galli . . . ad suos redeunt / tribuni militum cum tribus Fabiis creati.*

Thus compression, subordination, and—above all—style serve to give these complex events a relatively simple structural pattern and to emphasize the most important idea. Four lengthy sentences serve for introduction: one for sending the Clusine embassy, one for sending the Roman embassy, one for a statement by the Gauls, one for a reply by the Romans. Brief sentences in the historic present follow, giving the chief stages in the action: the Fabii take up arms, Q. Fabius kills a chieftain, the Gauls sound retreat, the Senate refers judgment of the Gallic claims to the people, the Gallic legates return to Clausium threatening war. Each of these in turn is followed by short sentences amplifying what has taken place. The most important point in the episode is placed where the two styles meet.

II. SOURCES AND INNOVATION

Livy's narrative of the disaster at the Allia and of the sack of Rome is the

product of a long and complex tradition. Numerous scholars have made attempts to separate the authentic elements from the fabrications, and then to trace the provenance and order of these later accretions. The initial study of Mommsen still holds first place, despite being superseded on this or that point by work of later scholars. For example, many believe that an appeal by Clusium to Rome in this period is out of the question; it would have been brought into the story *circa* 225 when the city played a role in the Gallic *tumultus*.³⁵ Hence the Fabian embassy would also have been an addition made around the same time, doubtless to explain why the Gauls advanced on Rome and to give an *aitia* for Rome's defeat.³⁶ The episode involving Q. Caedicius, the centurion at Veii, also seems to have been modeled on events of the third century.³⁷ The *devotio* of the elders has overtones of the death of the consul Octavius in 87 as well as certain borrowings from Greek literature.³⁸ Other Greek reminiscences have been noted.³⁹ And almost all scholars are agreed that the introduction of Camillus into the legend came relatively late (see below).⁴⁰

³⁵ Cf. Pol. 2.25-31; see J. M. Nap, *Die römische Republik um das J. 225 v. Chr.* (Leiden 1935) 8-9, 46; Wolski 36; Ogilvie 699-700. Some believe that there were two towns of the same name in this early period (Plin. *N.H.* 3.5.52: Clusini Novi, Clusini Veteres): for example, E. Richardson, *The Etruscans* (Chicago 1964) 23-24, 70-71. But the Clusini Novi more probably comprised a settlement of Sullan veterans near or at the site of the old town. Moreover, doubts about early contacts between Rome and Clusium may not be justified: cf. the saga of Lars Porsenna.

³⁶ See Mommsen 303-5; Nap (above, note 35) 326-27; Ogilvie 716. Wolski (33-34) believes that the killing done by the legates was modeled (in reverse) on the murder of Roman legates by the Gauls in 283 (cf. Ogilvie 715). But violence done to or by legates is a common enough *casus belli* that the origin of the story need not have been prompted specifically by Gauls. One thinks, for instance, of Queen Teuta and the Coruncanii in 230 (Pol. 2.8).

³⁷ His election seems to be a throwback from events in Spain in 212, his name from the military tribune of 258 (Cato fr. 83 P). See Mommsen 322-26; Ogilvie 730. Caedicius, as if from *caedes*, suits both the one who hears the forecast of disaster (32.6) and the one who inflicts it (45.8: *caedi nocturnae . . . maiorem caedem*). The views of V. Basanoff, *Latomus* 9 (1950) 13-26, are far-fetched.

³⁸ See Ogilvie 720, 725-26; Nap (above, note 35) 117, 196 note 1. The core of the story, however, is based on ancient and authentic Roman practice: see Ogilvie 725 and A. Magdelain, *Hommages à Jean Bayet*, Coll. Latomus 70 (1964) 435-36.

³⁹ E.g. see Mommsen 302-3, 321-22; G. Thouret, *Jahrb. für Class. Phil.* Suppl. 11 (1880) 136-41; Täubler 219; Wolski 42-43.

⁴⁰ One of the chief stumbling blocks in tracing and evaluating the development of the saga is the problem of identifying the source(s) of Diodorus. Almost every possible solution has been proposed, but nothing approaching a consensus has been reached. Mommsen (297-99) opted for Fabius Pictor; Münzer (324, 330, 337) judged the source

Münzer, following Pais and Niebuhr, suggested that perhaps the saga did not progress in a single, linear development, but that two differing, but equally early, versions existed: one, popular and transmitted chiefly by word of mouth, in which the city was "saved" and Camillus played a prominent role; and a second, featured in the earliest histories, which took no account of him.⁴¹ The theory has much to recommend it, although a few have demurred.⁴² Certainly the chief piece of evidence in its favor is the testimony of Aristotle as reported by Plutarch (*Cam.* 22.3). The philosopher not only recorded the sack, but reported that the city had been "saved"—the savior being a certain Lucius. The name must be an error, since Camillus' praenomen was Marcus (nor are there other Lucii in the saga who are likely candidates).⁴³ But this is no reason to reject the whole of Aristotle's testimony.

to be old and reliable, but was not so certain of its identity. Some advocate a date as late as Sulla (e.g., Wolski 25-26; Momigliano demurs, 112, note 7); some find references which seem to date to the Caesarian period: e.g., Hirschfeld 128-30; Ogilvie 699. Inevitably, intermediate theories have been advanced: i.e., Diodorus used *two* sources, one early and one late: e.g., Schachermeyr 284-89. Schachermeyr is one of the few who have tried to imagine just what types of information later historians had to hand and how they might have worked from them. His picture of Fabius Pictor using the pontifical notices may not be particularly convincing (he believes, among other things, that these notices were quite full for the sack: 299, note 1), but the questions he asks are challenging and fundamental. Parts of Diodorus are clearly confused (e.g., shifting the battle site from the left to the right bank of the Tiber), and certain parallels with Livy are striking: see Wolski 29 and note 2; Schachermeyr 292-94; Ogilvie 719.

⁴¹ See 334-35 and Münzer's references there; cf. E. Cocchia, *Rivista Indo-Greco-Italica* 6 (1922) 17-32. Recently scholars have uncovered an apparent third version which held that the Capitol itself was captured. O. Skutsch, *JRS* 43 (1953) 77-78 = *Studia Enniana* (London 1968) 138-42 with *postilla*, believes this was probably Ennius' version. Other scholars have subsequently found possible allusions to it in later writers: M. J. McGann, *CQ* 51 (1957) 126; G. W. Clarke, *CR* 81 (1967) 138. But perhaps not enough consideration has been given to the possibility of poetic or rhetorical exaggeration in these instances.

⁴² For example, Momigliano accepts it (113) and Täubler rejects it (231-32).

⁴³ I am not convinced by the suggestion that L. Albinus was the "savior" in this early version: M. Sordi, *I Rapporti Romano-Ceriti e l'Origine della Civitas Sine Suffragio* (Rome 1960) 49-52; Ogilvie 723-24; R. E. A. Palmer, *The Archaic Community of the Romans* (Cambridge 1970) 162-64. Although Albinus may have been the flamen Quirinalis himself in the original version, the Romans do not appear to have equated the preservation of the *sacra* with the saving of the city itself (cf. his elogium *CIL* 6.1217 = *ILS* 51 = *ILLRP* 13.3.11), nor is it likely that the Greek Aristotle would have equated them. I agree with Momigliano (113) that a distorted report of the Camillus legend is the best solution.

Nevertheless, even if this "popular" legend be reckoned very early, it is clear that it did not become incorporated into the *written* historical tradition until late—possibly not until Sullan times. Hence the many differing versions. Polybius (2.18, 22), who was most probably following Fabius Pictor,⁴⁴ mentions nothing about recovery of the gold or of a role for Camillus. On the other hand, some versions knew of the recovery of the ransom money, but not by Camillus: Strabo (5.2.3) and Diodorus (14.117.7) report that the Caeretans defeated the Gauls on their retreat northward and sent it back, Justin declared that Massilia replaced, but did not recapture, it (43.5.9), while Suetonius says that it was the progenitor of the Livii Drusi who recovered it (*Tib.* 3.2).⁴⁵ When Camillus was introduced into the legend he was reported to have seized the gold from the Gauls as they were withdrawing northward, but the location was identified variously from source to source.⁴⁶ Finally, Livy's version brought Camillus into the rubble of the forum itself, and before the gold had been completely weighed out. There are additional indications of a late date. For example, the night journey of Pontius Cominus was originally intended merely to open up the lines of communication between Veii and Rome (as in Diodorus: 14.116); later it was found ideal for reporting the request for, and granting of, the dictatorship.⁴⁷ But the appointment itself created problems. In one version (Dion. Hal. 13.6), Q. Caedicius, the centurion in Veii, after election as commander by his soldiers, appointed Camillus dictator. But this was clearly irregular on several counts.⁴⁸ An alternate and more satisfactory solution was to secure the election at Rome itself, but it is significant what form this took. Instead of one of the consular tribunes appointing Camillus dictator in the normal fashion (note that Q. Sulpicius was present and available), Camillus was popularly elected. This, as Täubler has argued, is probably modeled on Sulla's

⁴⁴ See Walbank 184–85 and references there.

⁴⁵ *Abnepos* of the tribune of 122. Münzer, *RE* 25 (1926) 853–55 s.v. "Livius Drusus" (12, 13), believes the date to be 283 and the story to be a late fabrication. Sordi (above, note 43) 149–51, considers it to be early.

⁴⁶ Pisaurum according to Serv. *ad Aen.* 6.825; a certain *Οὐδαρκιον* according to Diod. 14.117. See Münzer 336–37. Livy (5.49.6) reports a second battle, following the one in the forum, *ad octavum lapidem Gabina via*. See Sordi (above, note 43) 148–49.

⁴⁷ See Ogilvie's summary, 732.

⁴⁸ Vestiges of this version are evident at Livy 5.46.6–7.

election (and there are other features of Camillus' dictatorship and career with parallels in the Sullan period).⁴⁹ Moreover, further difficulties appear in the story, for Cominus left before the actual *lex curiata de imperio* was passed; Livy preferred to believe that Camillus would not have quit Ardea until formal announcement of its actual passage had been given him (46.11).⁵⁰

Livy's version clearly represents a late stage in the development of the saga; his source or sources can be dated no earlier than the Sullan period. Valerius Antias, Licinius Macer, and Claudius Quadrigarius have been suggested.⁵¹ Of these, slight preference can be given to Claudius.⁵² He is the only one of the three whose surviving fragments (1-7 P) concern these events; meager as they are, they coincide with Livy's version. If Livy did indeed use Claudius, however, he must have elaborated the material considerably. Claudius covered the

⁴⁹ It must at least date to after 217, when Minucius was popularly elected. But the Sullan period is probably responsible for the whole procedure. Although some of Täubler's parallels are not particularly convincing (e.g., the recall from disgrace and "exile," the battle before the city, the championing of senatorial interests), the manner of election, and the scope and duration of the dictatorship (cf. Livy 6.1.4) seem to me most telling. Cf. Ogilvie 728, 732.

⁵⁰ See Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* 3.1.41 note 1, and note 70 below.

⁵¹ See R. M. Ogilvie, *JRS* 48 (1958) 42-44; *Commentary* 699, 716, 720, 742. Ogilvie considers Licinius Macer "unlikely" (716), although he sees his influence at 5.46.11 (732). The digression on the Gauls (33.2-35.3) is certainly not from the same source; Ogilvie has shown that the source was undoubtedly Greek, Timagenes and Posidonius being equally probable (*Commentary* 700-702; *JRS* 48 (1958) 43 and note 49). Mommsen (345-46, cf. 324 and note 64) believed Livy used two sources, chiefly because of the "variant" at 46.11 on the election of Camillus as dictator.

⁵² See Zimmerer 140 ff., esp. 144-50; cf. Thouret (above, note 39) 148 ff. Ogilvie 736 and 738 believes that since Dionysius (13.13) puts the ransom gold at 2,000 lbs., while Livy, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Zonaras all give 1,000 lbs., he must have taken the figure from the 25 talents (= 2,000 lbs.) taken from the throne of Jupiter Capitolinus in 52 (Pliny *NH* 33.14, Varro *ap. Non.* 338L): "It follows that whereas D.H.'s source must be later than 52, L's must be earlier." But this argument seems to assume that information cannot be added by an extant writer, but only by his source. If a source *must* be postulated, Varro is known to have made the connection in his *De Vita Populi Romani*, as Nonius 338L reports. The work probably dates to 48-46 B.C.: see B. Riposati, *M. Terenti Varronis De Vita Populi Romani*, Pubblicazioni dell'università cattolica del S. Cuore 33 (Milan 1939) 84-86, cf. also 165-67, 250, 298. Moreover, Dionysius is known to have used Varro, and particularly Valerius Antias through Varro: see Palmer (above, note 43) 29-32. It is also generally admitted that Livy used Varro very little, if at all: Ogilvie 6. Note that Pliny, loc. cit., rejected Varro's inference about the amount of ransom gold. Cf. also Mommsen 330 note 75.

period from 390 to 218 in only three books;⁵³ his treatment of the Gallic catastrophe must therefore have been quite abbreviated.

All critics have assumed that Livy adhered quite faithfully to his sources. He might abridge, omit, or embroider for artistic or didactic purposes, but he seldom, if ever, made sweeping changes or invented outright. The finished product was thus likely to preserve clear traces of the political bias, special interests, and even stylistic peculiarities of the sources used. This view is based chiefly on the observable methods which Livy employed in adapting Polybius for large portions of Books 31–45.⁵⁴ But the present study suggests that in the early books—or, at least, in certain parts of these early books—Livy took a much freer hand than in the later Polybian sections. First of all, the structure which he imposed on his material dominates it completely, dictating both the scope and the emphasis of each part. Since it corresponds to his moral purpose as stated in the Preface, and since it is intricate and highly artificial—arising neither “naturally” nor logically from the events described—it seems almost certain that it was Livy’s own invention. It did not therefore derive from a source. Consequently, a great many events in the tradition had to be sharply curtailed, or omitted entirely; for others the historian resorted to expansion and free invention (as, for example, in the occupation of Rome, which he gives almost entirely in emotional and psychological terms: 42.1–43.5).⁵⁵ It might be argued that such changes, however pervasive, are of degree and not in kind: Livy can nowhere here be shown to alter the basic *facts* reported in his sources (reducing the Gallic march on Rome from four days to one, for example, or introducing scenes of “pity and fear” are neither basic nor extraordinary—both procedures can be paralleled in the “pure” Polybian sections). But a strong case, I believe, can be made for showing that Livy indeed was responsible for at least one basic alteration in the received tradition.

⁵³ See Zimmerer 5–10, who suggests that these books were chiefly introductory to the main narrative, as are Books 1–2 of Polybius. Note the number of “lower class” individuals: M. Caedicius *de plebe* (32.6), L. Albinus *de plebe homo* (40.9), Q. Caedicius *centurio* (45.7), Pontius Cominus *impiger iuuenis* (46.8; Plut. *Cam.* 25.1: τῶν μέσων κατὰ γένος πολιτῶν).

⁵⁴ H. Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius* (Berlin 1863) and Witte’s long article (above, note 1) are the chief studies on this important subject.

⁵⁵ See Ogilvie’s comment *ad loc.*; Burck 127.

To begin with, however, we should not expect a priori that Livy (or any other of the late annalists, for that matter) effected very many *fundamental* changes. Indeed, studies in such early legends as the sack of Rome or the Coriolanus saga show that the process of transformation was generally gradual and took place over a long period—each generation of writers adding to, or improving, different parts of the story according to its particular concerns and prejudices. In time a “tradition about the traditions” grew up: the major episodes of early Roman history assumed certain canonical outlines with which most readers were familiar. Hence the historians of early Rome could not reasonably expect, or want, to create surprise very often in the readers’ minds. The question is seldom “What will happen?”, but “How will it happen?” The pleasure of reading was in recognition of the familiar, realized not so much in the fulfillment of a story, but in expectation of its fulfillment—suspense of anticipation, not of revelation. Hence Livy’s fondness for delaying a climax as long as he can; hence, too, the swift introductions and conclusions to almost all episodes, large and small, throughout the *Ab Urbe Condita*. This partly accounts for the affinity many have felt between certain Livian episodes and the techniques, if not the plots, of Greek and Roman tragedies. Indeed, the techniques of so-called “tragic” history of the Hellenistic period were particularly suited to retailing the stuff of early Roman history.⁵⁶ Foreshadowing is one of them, and is a Livian hallmark. The disaster at the Allia is presaged by the warning voice on the Nova Via, with Livy himself reinforcing the foreboding as the main story gets under way: *adventante fatali urbi clade...* (33.1). Similarly, the outcome of the sacrifice of the elders is anticipated at the outset: *adventum hostium obstinato ad mortem animo exspectabant* (41.1). Indeed, it is imperative that the reader know in advance the outcome of such episodes; otherwise he cannot properly feel or appreciate the force of the narrative. Rarely a story might be so little known that a different kind of suspense—the surprise of revelation—was possible. Even less frequently would a major episode lend itself to this sort of

⁵⁶ On history and tragedy see the fine article by B. L. Ullman, *TAPA* 73 (1942) 25-53; on its influence on Livy see Burck 176-233 and Walsh 22-34, 176-90. For a more cautious appraisal see R. Jumeau, *REA* 38 (1936) 63-68 (cf. also *Latomus* 25 [1966] 561-62).

treatment. Yet this appears to be the case with the ending of the present story. Note that the "saving" of the city by Camillus' last-minute intervention is never foreshadowed or hinted at. Quite the contrary; the story seems to be moving relentlessly to a shameful conclusion: *Vae victis—redemptos vivere Romanos*. Moreover, later versions which bring Camillus into the ransom scene in the forum seem to have been taken directly from Livy alone.⁵⁷ What particularly encouraged him to aim for a surprise ending in this instance, of course, was the existence of a great variety of conflicting versions concerning the ransom. Some apparently recorded that even the Capitol fell, while others know of no recovery of gold or of a part for Camillus. Some claimed that the gold was subsequently recovered (again with no role for Camillus), but each disagreeing on the agent and the date. When Camillus was injected into the proceedings, he was permitted to defeat the Gauls on their retreat northward, but there was no con-

⁵⁷ Chief among them is Plutarch in his life of *Camillus* (28–29), the sources for which are still in dispute. A. Klotz, *RhM* 90 (1941) 282–309, reviews the various theories (282–85), but his attempt to deny that Plutarch used Livy at all is unconvincing. After all, Plutarch cites Livy at 6.2 (= 5.22.3), and even mistranslates a technical Latin word (*prosecuisset* at Livy 5.21.8 means "to cut out a victim's entrails," which Plutarch understood as *prosecutus esset*, hence his *κατακολουθήσαντι* at 5.4): on both Livian passages consult Ogilvie's valuable notes. Klotz assumes that Plutarch used only a single source, and rarely added or incorporated information from other sources—a much too rigid and mechanical conception. It seems to me more probable that for the Gallic catastrophe Plutarch used Livy and at least one other source (quite possibly several others), not merely alternating between them, but using one to supplement the other(s) as he went along. Certainly his account of Camillus' intervention in the forum contains nothing which could not have come from Livy and Plutarch's own pen. Livy also seems to be the only, or the chief, source for the encounter at Clusium (*Cam.* 17), the battle at the Allia (18.4–6: but not the preliminaries), the flight after the Allia (18.7), the episode of Albinus (21.1–2), Camillus at Ardea (23.2–24.3), Manlius and the geese, together with the aftermath (26.1–27.5), and the events leading to and including the ransom scene (28–29). For certain other events he has not relied exclusively or largely on Livy, although some details may be added from him: Camillus' trial, the meeting of the Senate concerning the actions of the Fabii at Clusium, the arrival at the Allia, the *devotio* of the elders, arrival of the Gauls in Rome after the Allia, and the journey of Cominus. It must be admitted, however, that no single passage in Plutarch points unequivocally to Livy as a *chief* source: (1) the citation of Livy at *Cam.* 6.2 is slightly inaccurate and may merely be an isolated variant which Plutarch did not recall exactly, (2) since *proseco* is a technical term, it quite likely appeared in other Latin versions, (3) no other change which Livy himself can clearly be shown to have made in the story appears in Plutarch. Hence *non liquet* might be a proper verdict. If it is maintained that Livy was *not* a source, then the date of Plutarch's source becomes important. If before Livy, then the final scene cannot be Livy's invention; if after, the source could have been based partly on Livy.

sensus on the site or on the circumstances. Here, then, was a rare opportunity to build to a surprise ending: which will he choose? The preceding narrative does not anticipate the outcome. If anything, it prepares the reader for the sort of ending one finds in Diodorus. Hence the surprise—really a *double* surprise, for by bringing Camillus into the forum itself he created an ending *no one* was quite prepared for. This grand and daring conclusion to the first pentad was doubtless meant chiefly as exciting reading. No one could take it very seriously, given the story's many improbabilities. Indeed, in some later references to the ransom gold Livy unblushingly represents it as paid, ignoring his earlier tampering with the canonical version (10.16.6, 22.59.7, 34.5.9: all in speeches). In fact, he permits Camillus in his final speech to describe the Romans as *victi captique ac redempti* (51.8); and there may be more than a hint of correction and of apology when he acknowledges Camillus' later victory over the Gauls on the via Gabinia to be the *iustus proelium* (49.6).

III. VERISIMILITUDE

Livy's account of the Gallic catastrophe shows beyond doubt that he turned his back on any attempt to retail these events "wie es eigentlich gewesen." In fact, he has not even bothered to narrate them "wie es am wahrscheinlichsten gewesen." This deserves further scrutiny, since the many improbabilities in the narrative appear at just those places where he can be shown to have taken a free hand in adapting his material. Critics have occasionally remarked on his disregard of realism and verisimilitude in his account of early Rome, but none has recognized it for the pervasive and characteristic phenomenon it is. How can we account for it?

Some seem to assume that he was careless in matters such as these, with the further implication that if he had not been so inattentive or hurried he would have corrected them.⁵⁸ This is possibly the explanation for certain minor inconsistencies: for example, when he

⁵⁸ Münzer, for example (334): "Characteristisch ist für sie, wie sie sorglos über alle Unebenheiten, Nebensachen und Unwahrscheinlichkeiten hinweggleitet, um die Peripetie des Dramas zu gewaltiger Wirkung zu bringen." Cf. also Ed. Meyer's lament, *Apophoreton* (Berlin 1903) 151.

depicts the Gauls investing Rome a few hours after the Allia was fought, the subsequent departure of the Vestals and other citizens must have taken place under their very noses. But inadvertence cannot explain most examples. Indeed, Livy flatly avoids devising rational explanations or understandable motives. The behavior of the Romans prior to the Allia is highly exaggerated and irrational; at no point does he attempt to say *why* they behave so deplorably, except to invoke *fatum* (32.7, 33.1, 36.6) and *fortuna* (37.1, cf. 38.4): *adeo occaecat animos fortuna, ubi vim suam ingruentem refringi non volt*. The sudden change of heart recorded at the first peripeteia is even more mysterious; the Gauls (and the reader) can only view the Allia as a *miraculum victoriae* (39.1) and the behavior of the Romans thereafter as *aliud priori simile miraculum* (39.2). The second peripeteia also illustrates Livy's willingness to sacrifice likelihood and realism for the sake of structural parallelism and narrative excitement. Camillus' long delay at Ardea is not explained, and only chance (*forte quadam*) accounts for his last minute intervention in the forum.⁵⁹ Moreover, the picture of him and his men picking their way over the rubble and through the ranks of the assembled Gallic army, apparently unnoticed and unchallenged, has much in common with the final scene of the "Pirates of Penzance." No, the answer must be that Livy was well aware of many such improbabilities in his narrative. And it is also clear that he was not much bothered, if bothered at all, by their presence.

Another explanation might be that he was indifferent to the sort of writing that aims for verisimilitude. But even a cursory examination of his adaptation of Polybius in the later books disproves this notion. Gone are most of the romantic improbabilities prevalent in the first decade; realistic details (*enargeia*) are added everywhere.⁶⁰ For example, when King Philip mounted the hill at Cynoscephalae where a preliminary clash of light-armed troops had taken place, Polybius says he found the summit deserted (18.24); Livy distributes a few corpses and arms over the field (33.8.9)—a neat touch, and quite convincing (there probably *were* a few casualties in the earlier skirmish). Again, at the conference at Nicaea between Flamininus and Philip, Livy depicts the king striding to the prow of his ship as it approached

⁵⁹ "Il deus ex machina del dramma": G. Funaioli, *Studi Liviani* (Rome 1934) 127.

⁶⁰ See Walsh 181 ff.

anchorage near shore where the Romans awaited (32.32.12)—whereas Polybius merely says “he remained afloat” (18.1); and after some preliminary words Livy (32.33.1) has an embarrassing silence fall between the two men as each waits for the other to begin in earnest—an effective detail not in Polybius. Examples can easily be multiplied.⁶¹

It is in his account of early Rome that Livy’s disregard for verisimilitude and realism seems most prevalent. The reason is doubtless due in part to his attitude toward the nature and reliability of the early tradition. That he viewed the whole of it with the gravest misgivings is abundantly clear. It was not merely that particular inventions and fabrications had intruded,⁶² or that individual stories were improbable (e.g., Horatius at the bridge earned *plus famae quam fidei* for his exploit: 2.10.11); more important, the entire picture was *uniformly* suspect. This was particularly true of events before the sack, in which most of the few records that did exist were destroyed; at the start of Book Six (6.1.2) he compares a man of his own time looking back on these events to one who catches only a glimpse of objects from far away: *res . . . vetustate nimia obscuras, velut quae magno ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur*. General shapes alone are discernable; their details are lost, and can only be guessed at. Some particulars handed down by tradition were probably authentic, but how could one be sure which were true and which not? Livy does not know, and admits it (7.6.6): *Cura non deesset, si qua ad verum via inquirentem ferret: nunc fama rerum standum est, ubi certam derogat vetustas fidem*. Hence he usually refuses to estimate the truth or falsity of what he relates, since particulars are not recoverable;⁶³ in matters so remote and so uncertain, approximations to the truth must be accepted in lieu of the truth itself.⁶⁴

⁶¹ See Witte *passim*.

⁶² Often to enhance the family history of this or that historian: e.g., 4.16.2-4, 7.9.1-6, 8.40.

⁶³ See, for example, Praef. 6-9, 5.21.8-9, 8.18.3, 29.14.9, for his general attitude. For examples of his remarks on particular problems see 1.3.2, 4.23.3, 27.1.13. It must be admitted, however, that his attitude is partly affected by the belief that, even if some particulars were knowable, the discovery would be negligible; for example, on the disputed cognomen of a consul, *in eo parvi refert quid veri sit* (8.18.2). I do not mean to suggest that Livy worked according to a set of predetermined critical principles; I agree with Hoffmann (*passim*, esp. 19, 36-40) that he took each case as it came and, if he was moved to criticize at all, did so according to intrinsic probability.

⁶⁴ E.g., 5.21.9: *In rebus tam antiquis si quae similia veris sint pro veris accipiantur, satis*

Perhaps this helps to explain the particular antipathy Livy felt toward his *bête noir*, Valerius Antias. Of course the man was a liar (*nullus mentiendi modus est*: 26.49.3), but no more so than the other annalists Livy used (he impartially points to exaggerations and outright inventions on all their parts).⁶⁵ No, what particularly nettled him about Antias was the latter's fondness for inventing precise details which would give his narrative the appearance of truth and authenticity.⁶⁶ He was especially fond of numbers—exact numbers (body counts made for propaganda purposes are not a recent invention: Antias made a specialty of them).⁶⁷ But Livy did not respect a historian who could unblushingly number the raped Sabine women at precisely 527 (fr. 3 P).⁶⁸ His attitude is best illustrated by the following remarks on an early battle (3.5.12–13): “For an event as old as this it is

habeam. But he goes on to draw the line at the particularly outrageous *fabula* in question: *Haec ad ostentationem scenae gaudentis miraculis aptiora quam ad fidem neque adfirmare neque refellere est operae pretium*. “In events as old as these I would be quite prepared to accept approximations of the truth in place of the truth itself. But it is not worth my approving or rejecting this particular story, since—far from inviting belief—it seems more suited to the stage, where miracles are at home and appreciated.” Moreover, symbolic truth can have as high a value as literal truth. In the Preface (7) he suggests that the military glory of the Romans makes their claim of Mars as their progenitor perfectly acceptable, even if he is not reckoned as the literal ancestor: *ea belli gloria est populo Romano ut cum suum conditorisque sui parentem Martem potissimum ferat, tam et hoc gentes humanae patiantur aequo animo quam imperium patiuntur*.

⁶⁵ On Licinius Macer 7.9.3–6; Coelius Antipater 21.47.4–5, 29.25.1–4, 29.27.13–15; Claudius Quadrigarius 25.39.12, 38.23.6–9; Antias 30.19.11–12, 32.6.5–8.

⁶⁶ Antias reproduced, or appears to have reproduced, official information found in the pontifical notices of the *Annales Maximi*. In general see Cic. *de Or.* 2.52, Cato fr. 77P, and A. H. McDonald (above, note 6) 155–59; on Antias in particular see Klotz (above, note 54) 24–49; Zimmerer 17–21, 36–43, 79 ff. Fronto described his style as *invenuste* (114N; cf. Cic. *de Leg.* 1.26). To begin with, then, his history had the appearance of an “official” chronicle in content and in style. Livy’s distrust, if not disinterest, in the minutiae of ancient days may help to explain his failure to incorporate more antiquarian material than he did; for example, he did indeed consult Cincius the antiquarian at 7.3.7 (see J. Heurgon, *Athenaeum* 42 (1964) 432–37), but is no sign of use of Varro, save possibly at 7.2.

⁶⁷ See, for example, 26.49.1–6, 30.19.11–12, 33.10.7–10, 36.38.6–7, 38.23.6–9. Walsh (121 note 2) suggests that these figures may represent the exaggerated claims of commanders in their official reports to the Senate. But Antias’ obvious inventions in early Roman history (where official reports are out of the question) and the failure of annalists to agree on casualty totals in the later period make this hypothesis unlikely.

⁶⁸ Livy does not give a number, except to say that he thinks it was higher than thirty (1.13.7). Ogilvie believes that Livy cannot therefore be using Antias here as a source. But if Livy *had* cited Antias’ figure, it could only have been to reject it.

difficult to give trustworthy figures on just how many fought and died. But Valerius Antias presumes to work up the totals: 5,800 Romans fell in Hernican territory; of the Aequi who entered and plundered Roman territory 2,400 were killed by the consul A. Postumius; another band, while driving off plunder, fell in with Quinctius and was slaughtered on an even grander scale, for the number of casualties amounted to four thousand three hundred and—keeping his count running down to the very last corpse—thirty.”⁶⁹

Livy saw nothing wrong with taking a somewhat free hand in narrating the history of early Rome; since it was uncertain and suspect, what else could one do? But he seems to have considered efforts to invest these events with a false appearance of exactitude not only misleading, but—perhaps more important—inappropriate to the spirit which animated, or ought to animate, them.⁷⁰ Livy states his view at the very start (Praef. 6): *Quae ante conditam condendamve urbem poeticis magis decora fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur*. Quite clearly he considered that this applied with equal force to events after the actual founding: in fact, down to the sack, and in gradually diminishing measure thereafter (6.1.1-3). The historian

⁶⁹ *Difficile ad fidem est in tam antiqua re quot pugnaverint ceciderintve exacto adfirmare numero; audet tamen Antias Valerius concipere summas: Romanos cecidisse in Hernico agro quinque milia octingentos: ex praedatoribus Aequorum qui populabundi in finibus Romanis vagabantur ab A. Postumio consule duo milia et quadringentos caesos: ceteram multitudinem praedam agentem quae inciderit in Quinctium nequaquam pari defunctam esse caede: interfecta inde quattuor milia et, exsequendo subtiliter numerum, ducentos ait et triginta*. Is it possible that Livy is using *exsequor* ambiguously here (i.e., both in its meaning of “follow to the grave” and “bring to completion”)? If so, the picture of Antias as the self-appointed *vespillo* to ancient battlefields is a marvellous touch.

⁷⁰ There is a puzzling exception to Livy’s general avoidance of overnice precision. After the senate has voted that a *lex curiata* should be passed recalling Camillus from exile and naming him dictator, Pontius Cominus leaves for Veii to relay the news. From there legates summon Camillus to Veii. But, says Livy (46.11), he prefers to believe that Camillus did not set out until the news reached him that the law had actually been passed. This bit of nit-picking has brought justified exclamations of puzzlement and exasperation from several quarters (e.g., Mommsen 324 note 64; Täubler 224): why couldn’t Cominus wait for an extra hour or two until the curiate assembly met and passed on the law?—difficulties have been created where none exist, or need to. The answer must be due partly to Livy’s desire to show his hero in the best possible light and partly as a contrast with the general disorder which led up to the Allia; there may also be a bit of self-advertisement in appearing to ferret out such subtle constitutional irregularities. Almost all scholars assume that Livy must have taken the quibble over from a source; but full responsibility could easily be his.

was therefore entitled, and possibly even obliged, to narrate the grand and stirring legends of early Rome in the spirit of the poet or the story-teller. Exaggeration and the miraculous were permissible and entirely at home in such contexts, provided they were not overdone. But throughout the historian must have a serious purpose. Since the stories embodied national ideals and moral values, he must strive to bring out these qualities clearly and forcefully. The *details* were untrustworthy, but the spirit which breathed through the legends, he believed, was decidedly not.